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BOOK REVIEWS 
HAND BooK ON iHE LAW OF EVIDENCE, BASED UPON THE MoDERN LAW OF 
EVIDENCE BY CHARI.ES FREDERICK CHAMBERLAYNE. By Arthur ,V. 
Blakemore and DeWitt C. Moore, of Boston and New York res-
pectively. Albany: Matthew Bender & Company, 1919; pp. xxxiv, 
1024 
The lawyer who, for the last two decades has kept abreast of the literature 
of the law, is appreciative of the fact that no branch of the old law has re-
ceived such scientific and scholarly treatment, as has the law of evidence, and 
few of the more modern fields have been as thoroughly and intelligently cul-. 
tivated. Led by Professor Thayer in that incomparable series ·of essays gath-
ered under one title in his "Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common 
Law," followed by Professor Wigmore with his edition of Greenleaf's first 
volume, and later by his great work "Evidence in Trials at Common Law," and 
this work of Professor Wigmore followed in turn by the exhaustive treatise 
of Mr. Chamberlayne who had previously given us the best American editions 
of both Taylor and Best, we are driven to acknowledge the field well tilled, 
even had no others been working in it. It is to be recognized however, that 
others have during this period done work of real practical value though, it may 
be, not possessing the same degree of scientific merit. 
As was to be expected, with treatment so exhaustive and so competently 
done as that in Chamberlayne's "Modern Law of Evidence," an abridgment in 
some form was certain fo be forth-coming, as making the work less physically 
cumbersome for that practical use for which a text on the law of evidence 
is so often demanded by the trial lawyer. 
It is to be observed in the outset that the cover title has a tendency to 
mislead. It is not "Chamberlayne's Hand Book on Evidence" but rather that 
of Blackmore and Moore. The reviewer is convinced that the editors of this 
"Hand Book" have produced a useful aid to the trial lawyer, l:)ut cannot es-
c;yie the conclusion that the work lacks that clearness, literary finish and to 
some extent, accuracy of statement sure to have been found in it, had the 
work been done by the author of the original treatise. While in any abridg-
ment literary style must in a measure be sacrificed, it is almost certain to 
suffer more at the hands of another than ab the hands of the author him-
self. From the author's discussion of the principles involved in that "no man's 
land" between fact and opinion, the editors have taken this sentence: "Mod-
ern judicial administration recognizes that! the spontaneous intuitive action of 
the mind, approving as it does, the uniformity of nature, is far more trust~ 
worthy than an act of volitional reasoning, subject to variations in operation 
which attend moral uniformity." (p. 515). This sentence in its original setting 
is illuminating, but in its isolation in the "Hand Book" lacks something of 
clarity and has little to help him who seeks information. It illustrates the 
difficulties of the abridger, particularly of him who attempts this service for 
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another, and who of necessity must lack in some measure a full appreciation 
of that other's point of view. 
No one is always right, but it is quite certain that the author would not 
have fallen into such an error as have the editors in their discussion o-€ what 
they are pleased to call the "pseudo-presumption of good character." '!'hey 
say: "It is a familiar rule of procedure, elsewhere considered, that unless, or 
until, the accused in a criminal case shall open the issue of character, no in-
ference shall be drawn that he did the act in question· because he had the 
traits of character which would permit or predispose him to do it." (§ 476.) 
The logical inference from such a statement is, that when the defendant has 
introduced evidence of his claimed good character, then the state may give 
evidence of his claimed bad character as a basis for the fof ere nee "that he 
did the act in question because he had traits of character which would permit 
or predispose him to do it." No principle is better settled in the law of evi-
dence than that such use cannot, save in one or two quite exceptional cases, 
be made of the evidence of bad character. One might look for this error to 
be corrected in the more general discussion of the evidentiary use of char-
acter in the subsequent section referred to, (§ 1029), but the correction is not 
found, the error, on the contrary is perpetuated. 
But these illustrations are not typical of many errors in either the exercise 
of judgment in the abridging process, or in the statement of the law. They 
are rather illustrative of some errors more likely to appear where the abridg~ 
ing process is worked out by a stranger. It is seldom true that the literary 
forms of two authors run well together, and they are certain to differ much 
in their measures of substantive values. 
It would be difficult to speak too extravagently of the work abridged, and 
the abridgment will be welcomed by the profession as a useful book, notwith-
standing it enters a field far from.barren before it appeared. 
The book is printed on thin paper in large type and with flexible cover, too 
large for the pocket but convenient to handle. V. H. LAN~. 
Tn Pos1TION oP Fom>rGN CoRPoRATIONS IN AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAr, LAw. 
A Contribution to the History and Theory of Juristic Persons in 
Anglo-American Law. By Gerard Carl Henderson, A.B., LL.B. 
Harvard Studies in Jurisprudence, II. Cambridge, University 
Press. London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press; 
1918. pp. xix, 199. , 
This is an illuminating and discriminating discussion and criticism of the 
Ameri~ decisiOns,-mostly'Federal,-upon many of the perplexing problems 
arising under the United States Constitution, when a corporation of one 
state claims rights in another state. 
· The constitutional provisions involved are: "Congress shall have power 
- to regulate commerce among the several states'' (Art. I, § 8, cl. 3) ; "The 
judicial power shall extend to controversies between citizens of different 
states" (Art. III, § 2); "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all 
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the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states" (Art. IV, § 2) ; 
"No state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due 
process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws." (Amend. XIV, §r.) 
In the ltltrod11etion the author calls attention to two theories as to the 
nature of a corporation,-as a highly privileged body with quasi-governmental 
powers such as the East India Co., or the Virginia Co., of r6oo and r607; or 
only as a convenient mechanism for carrying on business and trade by a 
group of persons. 
In Chapter II,-Begimiings of American Law, there is sketched the change 
from the old view, of special grants and privileges by King's Charter or 
special legislative act to the modern practice of freedom of incorporation un-
der general laws. 
The real discussion begins in Chapter III, The Rule of Comity, and 
starts out with Marshalrs and Taney's views of the nature of a corporation 
as a person and citizen . These questions arose as to the right of a corpora-
tion to sue in the federal courts, and the right to do business away from 
home. In r809, Bank of U. · S. v. Deveau:i:, 5 Cr. 6I, MARSHALL, C. ]. said 
a corporation is an artificial being and cannot be a citizen; only its members 
can be such; but if there is the requisite diversity between them and the 
other party, they may sue in the federal courts in the corporate name. In 
1839, whet:\ the question was as to the right of a corporation of one state to 
do business in another, 'Vebster argued, that if citizens of Pennsylvania can 
sue in their corporate name in Alabama, they have the same right under the 
privileges and immunities clause to trade there in that name. TAN:€Y, C. ]. 
in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, I3 Pet. 5I9, said, No. The corporation is an 
artificial person; it has no legal existence outside the creating state; it must 
dwell there and cannot migrate; its existence at home may·be recognized 
abroad; but this is a matter of comity in another state, and not a matter of 
right; it may be represented by agents abroad, who may contract for it there; 
but such contracts are its contracts, not those of its members individually, 
otherwise they would be individually liable on them, as partners. 
These decisions left the citizenship question in a very unsatisfactory shape, 
and the last one raised numerous questions as to suits against foreign cor-
porations. 
In Chapter IV, the author treats of The Citizenship of Corporations. 
Five years after the Earle case,.the court in Railway Co. v. Letson (I844), 
2 How. 497, declared a corporation may be treated as a citizen of the creating 
state, for the purpose of suit in the federal courts, as much as a natural per-
son. But in r853 after Mr. Justice DAN!Er, in a dissenting opinion, pointed 
out if that was true we might have a corporation member of the legislature, 
or president, or commander of the army or navy, the court got frightened at 
its boldness in the Letson case, executed a double somersault in Marshall v. 
B. & 0. Ry. (1853) I6 How. 3I4, holding a corporation, for federal jurisdic-
tion, is not and cannot be a citizen; only its members can be such; but they 
are conclusively presumed to be citizens of the creating state, although all of 
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them live elsewhere. This of course, landed the court in immediate confusion 
when the suit is between the corporation and one of its members living out-
· side the creating state, or when there has been a consolidation of two or more 
corporations created by different states. The author reviews these cases, and 
the unsatisfactory conclusions reached. 
In 1868, Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, after the Letson case, Webster's argu-
ment that a corporation was a citizen within the privileges and immunities 
clause was pushed with vigor, but the court, going back to the doctrine that 
"a grant of corporate existence is a grant of special privileges," held, con-
trary to the interpretation of similar words in treaties and international re-
lations generally, that the constitutional provision applied only to such privi-
leges and immunities "as are common to citizens under their laws and consti-
tutions by virtue of their being citizens,"-otherwise no state could limit the 
number of corporations doing business within its borders, for if it created a 
single c~rporation for any purpose, it would open the door for a flood of such 
from other states. This, however, left open a big question, when general 
laws gave a common right to all citizens to incorporate. 
If, as Chief Justice TANEY said, a corporation exists only at home, and 
cannot migrate, how and where can it be sued, and served with summons? 
The author treats of this in Chapter V, Jurisdicti01i of the, Courts over For-
eig1i Corporations, and shows that there had been, in the state courts, two 
theories: one, when a corporation of state A establishes a place of business in 
state B, and does business there, it is actually there, and can be sued and 
served with summons there; the other, that while the corporation is not there, 
it i11Jpliedly consents to be subject to the laws of state B, and can be sued and 
served with summons there if the laws of B soJ)rovide. This latter view was 
taken'. by the supreme court in La Fayette Insurance v. French (1855) 18 How. 
404; but the corporation must be doing business in the state, and the agent 
must be really representative to constitute due process. St. Clair v. Co~ 
(1882) !o6 U. S. 50. This consent, however, is peculiar: since the corpora-
tion has no.existence outside the creating state, and since jurisdiction cannot 
be conferred on the federal courts, either by c:onsent of the p~rties, or by 
state legislation,-yet if the legislature requires a corporation to consent to be 
found within the state as the condition of doing business there, then if it does 
business there, the courts, by a fiction can find it within the state although from 
its very nature it cannot be there. E~ Parte Schollenberger (1877) 96 U. S. 
369. But in Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane (1908), after the court had again 
held that a corporation can be an inhabitant and resident of the creating state 
only, it was ruled that a British corporation could be sued in the federal court 
irr New York, by a citizen bf New Jersey. 
The Power to E~clude Foreig1i Corporatioru, is the title of Chapter VI, 
and discusses C. J. TAmy's theory that a corporation does business in a 
foreign state only by the comity of that state, which can be withdrawn at any 
time. This was affirmed by Paul v. Virginia, and after holding in 1870, that 
a foreign corporation, even though it had agreed not to do so, could as its 
constitutional right remove a suit against it into the federal court, but for 
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so doing the state could revoke its license and expel it from the state. Doyle 
v. Insura11ce Co. (1876) 94 U. S. 535. 
Chapter VII, treats of Foreig11 Corporations and the Commerce Clause .. 
Pa11l v. Virginia held that insurance was not commerce, and this is still the 
doctrine of the court. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge &c. (1913) 
231 U. S. 493. In 1877, it was ruled that the states could not exclude a cor-
poration with authority from the United States to engage in interstate com-
merce from doing so. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. U. Tel. Co., g6 U. S. 1. 
It follows that a state could not tax the right to engage in interstate com-
merce, Glouc11ester Ferry Co. v. Penn. (1884), II4 U.S. lg6, although it could 
tax by a non-discriminating property tax the fairly valued proportion in the 
stat~ of all its property tangible and. intangible. Adams Express Co. v. 
Ohio (18g7) 165 U. S. 194; but a foreign telegraph company doing interstate 
and local business cannot be required to pay a license fee on all its capital 
stock for the privilege of doing a local business. Western Union Tel. Co. v. 
Kansas (1910) 216 U.S. l., contrary to what had been held in 1888, and 1892, 
as to mining companies, Hom v. Silver Mining Co. (1892) 143 U.S. 305. 
The author then in Chapter VIII goes back to The Doctrine of U11co11-
stit1ttio11al Conditioiis, such as the right of a state to exclude an insurance 
company from doing business in the state after it violated its promise not 
to remove a suit against it to the federal case as in the Doyle case above. 
Eleven years after this was decided it seemed to be overruled by Barron v. 
Bumside (1887) 121 U. S., 186, holding an insurance agent could not be pun• 
ished criminally for doing business in the state for an insurance companj 
that had failed to agree not to remove suits into the federal courts, since 
such an agreement would be void, and could not be made the basis of a 
criminal prosecution. Then in 1go6 the court again held that an insurance 
company's license could be revoked if it did remove suits to the federal 
courts contrary to its agreement, Security Mut. Iiis. Co. v. Previtt, 202 U. S. 
¢;but in 1916 this could not be done to a corporation engaged in interstate 
commerce. Doiw.ld v. Phila_delphifl. &q, <;o., 24~ U.S. 329. Also in 1910 there 
was a. series of cases, such as P1.1Uma.1• C:o. v. Kansas ~16 C. S. 56, holding 
that a state could not impose a tax O!.J. the property of such a company, both 
in and out of the state, for the privilege of do.i,ng lcx;;;il business. 
After the court had held that a corporation was not a citizen protected 
under the privileges and immupiti.es clatlse, corporations turned to the 
theory that; they were persQ11s, under the d11e process a.nd equal pro~ecti1211 
clauses of the XIV Amendment. The author discusses this matt~r in Chapter 
IX, Foreign Corporations and the Fourteenth. A,mendme11t. It was a,t once 
conceded that corporations were persons under the due p.rocesS" clause, l\lld 
there has been no dispute on this proposition. But if C. J. TANJ>y's view that 
a corporation dwelt only in the state of its creation, and could not migrate, 
how could it be said to be within the jurisdiction of 31.J.Other state and. be en-
titled, to the equal protection of the laws there? In 18g8, it was held that in 
order to be so protected it must be within the jurisdiction of the State. 
Blake v. McClung 172 U. S. 239. How can it be? No very satisfactory 
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answer has yet been given by the court. If it is engaged in interstate com-
merce, has entered the state by its consent an.I acquired property of a per-
manent kind, which cannot be easily disposed of, and \vhkh it uses in inter-
state commerce, it then is sufficiently within the State to be exempt from a 
tax for doing local business that is not imposed on domestic corporations of 
the same kind. Southern R.R. Co. v. Greene (I910) 2I6 U.S. 400. This, how-
ever does not prevent a state from taxing its own corporations (which are 
undoubtedly within its jurisdiction) but doing a large business outside the 
state on all of its capital stock, even if foreign corporations doing business. 
in the state can be taxed only in such proportion of its capital stock as is 
represented by the business in the state. Memphis &c. R. R. Co. v. Stiles 
(I9I6) 242 U. S. III. This looks like a discrimination against its own cor-
porations. 
Chapter X, is a Critical Re-examination, of the theories as to the nature 
of a corporation involved in the above very imperfectly outlined course of 
decisions. The author examines with care in the foregoing chapters a large 
number, about 300, of relevant cases, and points out what difficulty the courts 
have had in fitting their theories of corporations to_ the very complex situa-
tions that arise. He, on the whole, perhaps favors the recognition of the 
corporation as a citizen having civil capacity, for suits by and against it, and 
to a much larger extent as a citizen under the privilege and immunities clause, 
as to their functional capacity, under general incorporation laws of substan-
tially the same character. It is doubtful whether the courts will come to this 
latter policy. However this would be much nearer the Continental theories 
set forth so admirably in Young's Foreig1i Companies and other Corporations. 
The decisions upon these matters are in a constant flux, and it is impossible 
co predict what the court will do in reference to many of the questions in-
volved. Since this book was prepared, the court has recently handed down 
several decisions, some of which probably modify the decisions reviewed by 
the author. See Looney v. Crane Co. (I9I7) 245 U. S. I78, 38 S. Ct. 85; 
foternational Paper Ca. v. Massachusetts (I9I8) 246 U. S. 135, 38 S. Ct 292; 
Cheney Brothers v. Massaclmsetts, (1918) 246 U. S. I47, 38 S. Ct 295; 
Cudahy Packong Co. v. Minnesota (I9I8), 246 U. S. 450, 38 S. Ct 373; 
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. State (I9I8) 247 U. S. I32, 38 S. Ct. 
444; Peck & Co. v. Lowe (I9I8) 247 U.S. 165, 38 S. Ct. 432; Union Pac. R. 
R. Co. v. Pieblic Service Comm. (I9I8) 39 S. Ct 24; Wells Fargo & Co. 
v. State (I9I8) 39 S. Ct. 48. 
If Natura non it per salt1im, indicates that there is any such thing as na-
tural law, then it would seem from the foregoing, as we may suspect from Mr. 
Justice Hor.MES article 32 Harv. L. Rev. 40, that it does not have much place 
in the decisions of the supreme cotirt, for the evolutions not to say gyrations, 
disclosed by them show it proceeds quite frequently per salt111n. 
The author has produced a valuable book. It is dedicated to Mr. Justice 
BRANDEIS. H. L. WILGUS. 
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FOUR SOURCE BOOKS ON· INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS 
LES CoNvtNTioNs :ET Dscr.ARATIONS DE LA HAYE DE 1899 F:r 1907- Accom-
pagnees de tableaux des signatures, ratifications, et adhesions et des 
textes des reserves. Avec une introduction de James Brown Scott. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1918; pp. xxxiii, 318. 
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, through its Division oi 
International Law, publishes in this volume a French edition of one of the 
most convenient source books now available on the results achieved at the 
two Hague Peace Conferences. The volume contains an introduction by Mr. 
Scott, a collection of documents relating to the calling of the two confer-
ences, complete texts of final acts, conventions, and declarations, and an 
accurate record of signatures, ratifications, adhesions, and reservations. 'fhc 
texts of reservations are printed wherever available. The record of signa-
tures, ratifications, adhesions, and reservations has been verified in the United 
States Department of State and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
There is appended a list of delegates alphabetically arranged and a useful 
table analj•tique. The volume affords a convenient and reliable source of in-
formation as to the content of the various conventions and declarations and 
the extent to which they are now binding upon the participating states. It 
has been published previously in English and Spanish. It is now issued in 
in French in order that its contents may be still more widely available. The 
French edition has the unique advantage of presenting! the documents in the 
official text. 
UNE CouR DI': JusTICE INT:ERNATIONAL:E. Par James Brown Scott. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1918; pp. vi, 269. 
This volume'is also a French edition of matter previously published by the 
Endowment in English. Part I contains the letter and memorandum, with 
various documentary appendices, which Mr. Scott addressed to the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands in January, 1914 urging the estab-
lishment of a court of arbitral justice by the Netherlands and the eight great 
powers. Part II contains Mr. Scott's tractate on "The Status .of the Inter-
national Court of Justice," first published in July 1914, also with documentary 
appendices. 
THI': TREATIES OF 1785, 1799 AND 1828 BJ':TWEI':N THE UNITI':D STATI':S AND 
PRUSSIA. As int;erpreted in opinions of attorneys general, decis-
ions of courts, and diplomatic correspondence. Edited by James 
Brown Scott. New York: Oxford University Press, 1918; pp. 
viii, 207. 
Prior to the outbreak of war between the United States and Germany in 
1917, certain of the more important treaty relationships between the two 
countries were defined in the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1828 
and in articles of the earlier treaties which the Treaty of 1828 revived. Mr. 
Scott has brought together the English and French texts of the three historic 
treaties in question, important federal court decisions and opinions of atior-
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neys general on questions arising thereunder, and a considerable body of 
diplomatic correspondence relative to the controversy of I885-86 as to tonnage 
dues, the case of the William P. Frye, and the case of the Appam. This col-
. lection will be useful for the student who desires to become acquainted 
through original sources with the general subject matter of these diplomatic 
controversies. It should be useful also in smaller libraries where many of 
the sources are not available. 
THS ARMED NEUTRALITIES OF I780 AND I8oo. A collection of official docu-
ments preceded by the views of representative publicists.. Edited 
by James Brown Scott. New York: Oxford University Press, 
I9I8; pp. xxxi, 698. 
For a brief period before the entrance of the United States iI~to the world 
war there was a measure of interest in the idea of an armed neutrality. The 
documentary history of the principal American precedent for such a program 
was published by the Division of International Law of the Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace under the title THE CoNTROVSRSY OVER NEUTRAL 
RIGHTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE, I797-I8oo. In the present 
volume the same editor has collected the texts of the agreements, the orders 
putting them into effect, and diplomatic correspondence relative to the lead-
ing European precedents for armed neutrality. The volume offers English 
translations of many documents hitherto available only in foreign languages 
and brings in.to convenient compass a mass of material which has been acces-
sible only to the research student. More than one third of the book is de-
voted to extracts from American and foreign works on international law 
concerning the armed neutralities. The extracts from foreign works are in 
all cases rendered into English. The volume is a useful addition to the 
Carnegie Endow~ent's rapidly expanding collection of source bocks on in-
ternational questions. E. D. DICKINSON. 
